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D. Watson and A. Tellegen (19X5') proposed a "consensual" structure of affect based on J. A. Russell's
(1980) circumplcx. The authors" review of the literature indicates that this 2-factor model captures robust
structural properties of self-rated mood. Nevertheless, the evidence also indicates that the circumplcx
does not fit the data closely and needs to be refined. Most notably, the model's dimensions are not
entirely independent: moreover, with the exception of Pleasantness—Unpleasantness, they are not com-
pletely bipolar. More generally, the data suggest a model that falls somewhere between classic simple
structure and a true circumplex. The authors then examine two of the dimensions imbedded in this
structure, which they label Negative Activation (NA) and Positive Activation (PA). The authors argue that
PA and NA represent the subjective components of broader biobchavioral systems of approach and
withdrawal, respectively. The authors conclude by demonstrating how this framework helps to clarify
various affect-related phenomena, including circadian rhythms, sleep, and the mood disorders.
On the basis of a review and reanalysis of the existing data,
Watson and Tellegen (1985) concluded that "a basic two-
dimensional structure of affect emerges across a number of differ-
ent lines of research and a very large number of analyses" (p. 234).
They noted, moreover, that this structure emerged even in data sets
compromised by methodological problems such as acquiescence
bias and inappropriate response formats. Accordingly, they argued
that this structure now was "firmly established as the basic struc-
ture of English-language affect at the general factor level" (p. 219).
More than a decade has passed since Watson and Tellegen
(1985) articulated this "consensual" model. The model has stim-
ulated an enormous body of research, including a growing litera-
ture— using advanced data analytic techniques (such as confirma-
tory factor analysis) that were not widely available in 1985—on
the adequacy of the model itself. How has it fared in the face of
such scrutiny? Can it still be accepted as the basic structure of
affect at the general factor level? Moreover, what have we learned
about the basic dimensions of mood? The goal of this article is to
examine these questions in light of contemporary data. We begin
by examining the validity of this two-factor model. We then
explore a specific conceptualization of this model that emphasizes
the importance of two dimensions of activation. Our primary focus
throughout the article will be on self-rated mood and emotionality,
but we will consider other lines of evidence as well.
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The Affect Circumplex
Historical Overview
The model proposed by Watson and Tellegen (1985) was
itself the product of a long line of research into the basic
dimensions of affect (for historical reviews, see Russell. 1980;
Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Although some of the earlier models
argued for the existence of three major dimensions (e.g., Engen,
Levy, & Schlosberg, 1958), affect researchers gradually con-
verged on a two-factor structure. Specifically, analyses of facia!
and vocal emotional expressions, judged similarities among
mood words, and semantic differential ratings of mood terms all
suggested the existence of two general dimensions: Pleasant-
ness versus Unpleasantness and Activation or Arousal (see
Russell, 1979, 1980). In 1980, Russell made a major contribu-
tion to this literature by proposing that these two dimensions
define a circumpiex, that is, a model in which mood descriptors
can be systematically arranged around the perimeter of a circle.
In essence, this affect circumplex contained four bipolar dimen-
sions that were spaced 45° apart: Pleasantness (pleasure vs.
misery), Excitement (excitement vs. depression), Activation
(arousal vs. sleepiness), and Distress (distress vs. contentment;
see Russell, 1980, Figure 1, p. 1 164). It must be emphasized,
however, that Russell continued to view Pleasantness and Ac-
tivation as the basic dimensions of affect.
Although Russell (1980) presented some evidence suggesting
that this circumplex also characterized self-reported mood, most of
the available data suggested that self-ratings actually were char-
acterized by a much larger number (typically from 5 to 11) of
relatively small factors (see Watson & Tellegen, 1985, pp. 219-
220). However, by reanalyzing the data from these studies, Watson
and Tellegen (1985) were able to demonstrate that the same basic
two-dimensional structure also consistently emerged in self-report
data; it was this robustness across different types of evidence that
led Watson and Tellegen to declare this structure to be "basic."
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Moreover, on the basis of these reanalyzed data, they presented a
circular structure that was designed to resemble Russell's circum-
plex as closely as possible. This structure is displayed in Figure 1.
Paralleling Russell's model, Watson and Tellegen's structure
depicts four bipolar dimensions that are spaced 45° apart:
Pleasantness (happy vs. sad). Positive Affect (excited vs. slug-
gish). Engagement (aroused vs. still), and Negative Affect
(distressed vs. relaxed)- In contrast to Russell, however, Watson
and Tellegen emphasized the importance of the Negative Affect
and Positive Affect dimensions that are depicted by the solid
lines in Figure 1.
Although Watson and Tellegen's (1985) circle was designed
to resemble Russell's (1980) circumplex, a close inspection
reveals that the two structures are not identical. The two
schemes do show very close agreement across the five-octant
arc that defines the upper half of the circle depicted in Figure 1.
However, whereas Figure 1 places terms such as sad and
depressed in the Unpleasantness octant, Russell moved them
45° to Low Positive Affect. Moreover, Russell viewed sleepv as
a marker of Disengagement rather than of Low Positive Affect.
Despite these inconsistencies, the two models generally are
quite similar, and we emphasize this similarity throughout most
of this article. Nevertheless, it also is apparent that they define
somewhat different structures, so that one of them actually may
fit the available data better than the other. Accordingly, we will
consider these models separately when examining the overall
validity of the circumplex.
We also must briefly consider two later adaptations of this affect
circumplex. First, in a widely cited article, Larsen and Diener
(1992, Figure 2.1) presented a circumplex that was adapted from
those of Russell (1980) and Watson and Tellegen (1985). A close
inspection of this model, however, indicates that it essentially
defines the same structure as the one displayed in Figure 1.
Specifically, of the 38 terms depicted in Figure 1. 27 also were
included in Larsen and Diener's circumplex. Of these 27. 26 (96%)
were placed in exactly the same octants as in Figure 1 (the lone
exception is that Larsen and Diener moved active 45° to the
Engagement octant). Thus, for the purposes of this article, we will
treat the Watson and Tellegen and Larsen and Diener circles as
defining the same structure.
Second. Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) presented a revised
and updated circumplex that appears to represent an amalgam of
these earlier schemes, combining idiosyncratic elements from each
of them. For instance, unlike Russell (1980)—but consistent with
the structure depicted in Figure 1—terms such as tired and slug-
gish now are viewed as indicators of Low Positive Affect rather
than of Disengagement. On the other hand, unlike Figure 1 — but
consistent with Russell (1980)—sleepy is considered to be a man-
ifestation of Disengagement (see Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998,
Appendix A). Once again, although these differences seem rela-
tively minor, they nevertheless may influence the model's ability
to fit the empirical data, such that this scheme may fit the data
better—or worse—than those presented by Russell and Watson
and Tellegen (1985).
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Figure /. The two-dimensional structure of affect. From "Toward a Consensual Structure of Mood," by D.
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Empirical Status of the Affect Circumplex
Problems with the schematic model. As we have discussed,
this circumplex purportedly represents the basic structure of affect
at the higher order level. It is important to note, therefore, that an
extensive body of evidence has demonstrated the basic validity of
this model. To date, the bulk of its support has come from explor-
atory factor analyses of self-report mood data, which consistently
have demonstrated the existence of two general factors, not one or
three. It is noteworthy, moreover, that the same two general
factors—corresponding to the Negative Affect and Positive Affect
dimensions shown in Figure 1 — have been identified across dif-
ferent sets of descriptors, time frames, response formats, and
rotational schemes, and in both within- and between-subjects anal-
yses (see Almagor & Ben-Porath, 1989: Mayer & Gaschke. 1988:
Watson, 1988; Watson & Clark, 1997).
Furthermore, confirmatory factor analytic and structural model-
ing data consistently have corroborated key aspects of this struc-
ture. Most notably, the Figure 1 model clearly posits the existence
of both (a) a bipolar Pleasantness-Unpleasantness dimension
(which opposes positively vs. negatively valenced affects along a
single axis) as well as (b) separable dimensions of Negative Affect
and Positive Affect (which place positively and negatively va-
lenced affects onto different axes). Several studies now have
confirmed the existence of all of these dimensions within the same
set of self-report data (e.g., Feldman Barrett & Russell. 1998:
Tellegen, Watson. & Clark, in press).
Thus, considerable evidence supports key aspects of the struc-
ture displayed in Figure 1. Nevertheless, it recently has become
apparent that this model ultimately fails to fit the empirical data
well. For instance, Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998, Study 3)
conducted three separate confirmatory factor analyses to determine
whether variables representing the four bipolar dimensions of
Figure 1 actually defined the posited two-dimensional structure
(see their "joint structure" analyses and the accompanying Table
9). It is important that all three analyses demonstrated that the
model did not fit the data well. Specifically, on the basis of the
parameters reported by Feldman Barrett and Russell, we computed
the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Browne &
Cudeck. 1993), a widely used fit index that rewards parsimony in
model specification. According to Browne and Cudeck (1993),
RMSEA values of .05 or less indicate a close fit, values in the
.05-.08 range indicate a reasonable fit, and values of. 10 or greater
demonstrate a poor fit. In the three analyses reported by Feldman
Barrett and Russell (1998), the RMSEA values were .135, .131,
and .106, respectively, indicating a consistently poor fit.
As noted earlier, Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) tested a
circumplex model that differed slightly from the ones examined by
both Russell (1980) and Watson and Tellegen (1985). Conse-
quently, it could be argued that one of these earlier models might
fit the data better. Our own analyses, however, reveal that these
earlier schemes similarly fail to yield an acceptably close fit.
Specifically, we now have conducted analyses of three different
data sets using Browne's (1992) CIRCUM procedure, a structural
modeling technique for testing circumplexity (see also Fabrigar,
Visser, & Browne, 1997). In each case, we designated the High
Positive Affect octant of Figure 1 as the reference variable (i.e.,
fixed its location on the circle at 0°) and used the maximum
likelihood method to fit the model.
Two of these analyses explicitly tested the structure depicted in
Figure 1. The first analysis (Sample 1) was based on the responses
of 486 undergraduates who rated their current, momentary affect;
the second (Sample 2) involved 317 students who completed a
general, trait version of the same questionnaire. In both samples,
respondents rated the extent to which they had experienced each
mood descriptor on a 5-point scale, where 1 = very slightly or not
at all and 5 = extremely.
Respondents in both samples rated themselves on the 38 affect
terms depicted in Figure 1. The descriptors defining each octant
then were summed to yield an overall measure of that octant; note,
however, that two terms (placid and quiescent) had to be dropped
because many respondents were unfamiliar with them and left
them blank. These eight scales then were submitted to separate
CIRCUM analyses of each data set. We initially tested constrained
models in which the polar angles were forced to be equally spaced
around the circle (i.e., 45° apart, as they appear in Figure 1), and
the minimum correlation was set at —1.00. These constrained
models yielded an extremely poor fit: For the momentary data,
X
2(18. N = 486) = 495.71, p < .005. RMSEA = .234; for the
general data, *
2(18, N = 317) = 509.66, p < .005, RMSEA =
.294. We therefore tested a second pair of models in which these
constraints were removed (i.e.. the variables were free to be placed
more—or less—than 45° apart, and there was no constraint on the
minimum correlation). The model now fit the data marginally well
in the momentary ratings, *
2(8, N = 486) = 42.43, p < .005,
RMSEA = .094, but continued to fare rather poorly in the general
ratings. r(8. N = 317) = 46.80, p < .005. RMSEA = .124.
The third analysis (Sample 3) tested Russell's version of the
circumplex in a sample of 421 University of Iowa undergraduates
who rated their current, momentary mood on the same 5-point
scale. Using the terms presented in Russell (1980) and Feldman
Barrett and Russell (1998) as a guide, we constructed 3- or 4-item
scales to assess each octant. Specifically, the scales consisted of
active, enthusiastic, excited, fit (High Positive Affect); aroused,
wide awake, alert (Engagement); scared, nervous, jittery (High
Negative Affect); unhappy, distressed, downhearted (Unpleasant-
ness); gloomy, blue, sad, discouraged (Low Positive Affect);
sleepy, drowsy, tired, sluggish (Disengagement); rested, calm,
relaxed, tranquil (Low Negative Affect); and happy, pleasant,
content, satisfied (Pleasantness). As before, we began by testing a
constrained model that fit the data quite poorly, )f(l&, N = 421)
= 663.63, p < .005, RMSEA = .292. We then tested a second
model in which these constraints were lifted, but this again indi-
cated that the fit was poor, ^(8, N = 421) = 90.41. p < .005,
RMSEA = .157.
Thus, all of the major conceptualizations of the circumplex have
been found wanting, even after key assumptions (such as equal
spacing around the perimeter of the circle) are relaxed. Clearly, the
neat schematic depicted in Figure 1 fails to capture the complex-
ities of real-world data. What has gone wrong? In answering this
question, we begin by noting two important findings that have
emerged in these data. First, it is apparent that once one has
controlled for both random and systematic sources of error, the
major dimensions of the model are not, strictly speaking, indepen-
dent (i.e., 90° apart) of one another. On the one hand, it appears
that the Pleasantness and Activation dimensions are positively
correlated; Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998), for example, re-
ported correlations in the .10—.25 range across their various con-SPECIAL SECTION: TWO GENERAL ACTIVATION SYSTEMS 823
firmatory factor analyses. On the other hand, it appears that the
Positive Affect and Negative Affect dimensions are moderately
negatively correlated; in three different studies, the error-corrected
correlation between the latent dimensions was estimated to be
— .43 (Tellegen et al., in press), -.44 (Diener, Smith, & Fujita,
1995), and -.46 (Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998).
Second, although the Pleasantness dimension has emerged as
quasi-bipolar in these analyses, the bipolarity of the remaining
axes has proven to be more problematic. After controlling for
measurement error, terms defining the opposite poles of these
dimensions should correlate close to -1.00 with one another. In
the case of Pleasantness-Unpleasantness, this prediction consis-
tently has been confirmed. For instance, Tellegen et al. (in press)
obtained a corrected correlation of —.91 between markers of
Pleasantness and Unpleasantness; similarly, Feldman Barrett and
Russell (1998) reported corresponding correlations of -.93 (Study
2) and —.93 (Study 3). In parallel analyses of high and low
Activation markers, however, Feldman Barrett and Russell re-
ported corrected correlations of —.80 (Study 2) and -.73 (Study
3). Similarly, in their Study 3, Feldman Barrett and Russell ob-
tained corrected correlations of -.71 and —.79 between markers
of high and low Positive Affect and high and low Negative Affect,
respectively. Although these correlations obviously are quite sub-
stantial, they nevertheless are significantly lower than the pre-
dicted correlation of nearly — 1.00 and indicate a nontri vial amount
of distortion in the model.
Refining the model. Earlier, we reviewed evidence demon-
strating that other key elements of the model are well established
and clearly reflect robust properties of self-rated affect. Neverthe-
less, it is apparent that the neat schematic shown in Figure 1 fails
to capture some of the complexities in the empirical data. It
therefore is crucial that researchers continue to refine this two-
dimensional model so that it better captures the nature of real-
world affective experience. What sort of structure actually emerges
in these data? To address this issue, in Table 1 we present
CIRCUM's parameter estimates of the polar angles for the octant
scales in each of our three samples; it also indicates whether this
polar angle deviates significantly from the hypothesized model
Table 1
Point Estimates for Polar Angles in the CIRCUM Analyses
(Minimum Angle Unconstrained)
Octant scale
High Positive Affect
Engagement
High Negative Affect
Unpleasantness
Low Positive Affect
Disengagement
Low Negative Affect
Pleasantness
1
0
24
a
91
122'
168'
204'
260'
319
Sample
2
0
32'
103
a
123'
132'
192'
261
323
3
0
15»
105'
130
176
205'
315'
335'
M
0
24
100
125
159
200
279
326
Note. Ms = 486 (Sample 1), 317 (Sample 2), and 421 (Sample 3).
Samples 1 and 3 are based on momentary mood ratings; Sample 2 is based
on general mood ratings. Samples 1 and 2 test Watson and Tellegen's
(1985) model; Sample 3 tests Russell's (1980) model.
' The polar angle deviates significantly from the hypothesized model.
(i.e., whether the 95% confidence interval for the angle contains
the value that is hypothesized in Figure 1). Table 1 also shows the
mean point estimate for each scale, computed across all three
samples. For illustrative purposes, these mean values are plotted in
Figure 2. In interpreting these results, it should be recalled that
Figure 1 places these variables at regular 45° intervals, so that
Engagement should be at 45°, High Negative Affect at 90°, Un-
pleasantness at 135°, and so on.
These data clearly demonstrate that the Figure 1 schematic both
(a) captures important properties of mood ratings but (b) fai|s to
provide a close fit to the actual data. It is noteworthy that the
Engagement-Disengagement axis is associated with the greatest
distortion, as both ends of this dimension consistently deviated
from their predicted position in the circumplex (the Engagement
scale is misplaced by an average of 21°, whereas Disengagement
deviates by an average of 25°). More generally, the distortions are
not random but rather are quite systematic. Note that the Disen-
gagement and Low Positive Affect markers are displaced toward
Unpleasantness and High Negative Affect; these latter scales are
shifted toward each other, so that they are only 25° apart (instead
of the hypothesized 45°). Similarly, Low Negative Affect and
Engagement are shifted toward Pleasantness/High Positive Affect,
which are only 34° apart.
All of this movement has the net effect of creating two broad
"superclusters"; the first (spanning from High Negative Affect to
Disengagement) occupies only 100° of the circle, whereas the
second (ranging from Low Negative Affect to Engagement) occu-
pies only 105°. These clusters are separated by two large gaps at
opposite ends of the space (76° between Engagement and High
Negative Affect, 79° between Disengagement and Low Negative
Affect); these gaps emerge because no variables fall close to the
hypothesized Engagement-Disengagement axis. In other words,
none of these variables is affectively neutral; rather, all of them can
be characterized as either positively or negatively valenced, at least
to some degree. More generally—and consistent with the data
reported by Russell and Feldman Barrett (1999)—these results
indicate that affective structure actually falls somewhere between
classic simple structure (in which the variables should cluster in
dense groups) and a true circumplex (in which the variables should
be equally spaced and define a complete circle).
These CIRCUM analyses are based entirely on between-
subjects data, which are subject to systematic errors such as the
acquiescence response bias (see Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998;
Green, Goldman, & Salovey, 1993; Tellegen, Watson, & Clark,
1994, in press). Consequently, it is important to examine the
structural properties of within-subject data in which such errors
have been controlled. We therefore examined data from three
intensive intraindividual studies of mood. Participants in the first
sample ("Moment Data-SMU") were 226 Southern Methodist
University (SMU) undergraduates who rated their current mood
once per day for 45 days (M = 45.0 observations per respondent;
overall N = 10,169 observations). The second sample ("Daily
Data-SMU") consisted of 254 SMU students who rated their daily
mood once per day for 6-7 weeks (M = 44.6 observations per
respondent; overall N = 11,323 observations). Finally, participants
in the third sample ("Daily Data-Iowa") were 135 University of
Iowa undergraduates who rated their daily mood once per day for
approximately 7 weeks (M = 48.8 observations per respondent;
overall N = 6,593 observations). To eliminate all between-subjects824 WATSON, WIESE, VAIDYA, AND TELLEGEN
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Figure 2. Mean polar angles (computed using CIRCUM) for the eight octant markers of the affect circumplex,
averaged across all three analyses. PA = Positive Affect; NA = Negative Affect.
variance, we standardized these ratings (M = 0, SD = 1) on a
within-subject basis and collapsed them across all of the partici-
pants in each sample. This permitted us to compute average
within-subject correlations in each data set that then could be
subjected to P-technique factor analyses.
All of these respondents rated themselves on the Expanded
Form of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X;
Watson & Clark, 1994), a 60-item questionnaire that contains good
markers of seven of the eight octants depicted in Figure 1 (only
Disengagement is not assessed). We used the original 10-item
Positive and Negative Affect scales from the PANAS (Watson,
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to assess the High Positive Affect and
High Negative Affect octants, respectively. In addition, we used
the 5-item Sadness scale (sad, blue, downhearted, alone, lonely) to
assess Unpleasantness, the 4-item Fatigue scale (sleepy, tired,
sluggish, drowsy) to measure Low Positive Affect, the 3-item
Serenity scale (calm, relaxed, at ease) to measure Low Negative
Affect, and the 3-item Surprise scale (surprised, amazed, aston-
ished) to assess Engagement. Finally, we summed four items from
the PANAS-X Joviality scale (happy, joyful, cheerful, delighted) to
measure Pleasantness.
We subjected these seven octant markers to a separate
P-technique factor analysis (principal-factor analysis with squared
multiple correlations in the diagonal) in each sample; we extracted
two factors in each solution and rotated them using varimax. The
rotated loadings from each solution are presented in Table 2; in
addition, the loadings from the momentary mood solution are
plotted in Figure 3. These data replicate the CIRCUM results and
again demonstrate mixed support for the affect circumplex. On the
one hand—and consistent with the model—clearly recognizable
bipolar dimensions of Positive Affect (i.e., High Positive Affect,
Pleasantness, and Engagement vs. Low Positive Affect) and Neg-
ative Affect (i.e., High Negative Affect and Unpleasantness vs.
Low Negative Affect and Pleasantness) emerged in all three
solutions.
On the other hand, several aspects of the data are inconsistent
with the model. First, the bipolarity of the Positive Affect dimen-
sion is much stronger in the moment data than in the daily data
(a point we consider subsequently). Second, consistent with the
CIRCUM results, Engagement obviously is not affectively neutral
but rather is positively valenced and shifted toward the Positive
Affect axis. Third, Unpleasantness has unexpectedly low (nega-
tive) loadings on Positive Affect, whereas High Positive Affect has
unexpectedly high (negative) loadings on Negative Affect. Taken
together, these findings suggest that the gaps between (a) Pleas-
antness and High Positive Affect and (b) Unpleasantness and High
Negative Affect are not quite as large as Figure 1 indicates; this is
confirmed in Figure 3, which shows that the two sets of scales
actually cluster close to one another.
More generally—and replicating Figure 2—Figure 3 again sug-
gests the presence of two "superclusters," one consisting of Low
Positive Affect, Unpleasantness, and High Negative Affect and the
other composed of Pleasantness, High Positive Affect, and En-
gagement. Furthermore, we again see a gap indicating that no
variables fall directly on the hypothesized Engagement axis. Fi-
nally, consistent with previous research in this area (e.g., Feldman,
1995; Russell, 1980), Figure 3 demonstrates that affect self-ratings
actually tend to form an ellipse rather than a circle; this reflects theSPECIAL SECTION: TWO GENERAL ACTIVATION SYSTEMS 825
Table 2
Varimax-Rotated P-Technique Factor Loadings (Based on Average Within-Subjects Correlations)
of Momentary and Daily Mood Ratings
Octant scale
High Positive Affect
Pleasantness
Engagement
Low Positive Affect
High Negative Affect
Unpleasantness
Low Negative Affect
PA
Moment
data:
SMU
.82
.69
.46
-.62
-.10
-.20
.03
factor loadings
Daily
SMU
.66
.57
.48
TO
-.01
-.16
.12
data
Iowa
.69
.59
.51
-.36
-.02
-.19
.16
NA
Moment
data:
SMU
-.32
- .50
.16
.22
.77
.59
-.48
factor loading
Daily
SMU
-.47
-.61
.06
.33
.77
.65
- .55
s
data
Iowa
-.41
-.59
.07
.29
.77
.62
•-.61
Now. Total numbers of observations = 10,169 (Moment-Southern Methodist University 1SMU]). 11.323
(Daily-SMU). and 6.593 (Daily-Iowa). PA = Positive Affect; NA = Negative Affect.
fact that valence (i.e.. Pleasantness vs. Unpleasantness) exerts a
much greater influence on mood ratings than does arousal (i.e..
Engagement vs. Disengagement).
Once again, we emphasize that key features of the affect cir-
cumplex (such as the existence of a bipolar valence dimension, as
well as separable dimensions of Positive Affect and Negative
Affect) are well established and clearly reflect robust properties of
seli'-rated affect. We certainly are not advocating that this model be
scrapped altogether. However, as stated earlier, we believe that it
is time to refine this structure so as to address the problems we
have noted (such as the unequal spacing of the hypothesized
markers and the absence of variables along the Engagement-
Disengagement axis) and to fit the empirical data more closely. We
therefore recently proposed a modified three-level hierarchical
structure that retains the essential features of our old model but that
abandons the rigid schematic eircumplex of Figure 1 (see Tellegen
et al.. in press). A general bipolar dimension of Pleasantness versus
Unpleasantness comprises the highest level of this hierarchy. The
intermediate level of the structure consists of the Positive and
Negative Affect dimensions that are the primary focus of our own
High PA
Pleasantness
Engagement
Low NA
Unpleasantness
High NA
Low PA
Figure 3. Two-dimensional plots showing the average P-technique factor loadings of seven octant markers of
the affect eircumplex (from the Moment Data-Southern Methodist University [SMU] solution). PA = Positive
Affect; NA = Negative Affect.826 WATSON, WIESE, VAIDYA, AND TELLEGEN
work. Finally, the lowest level of the hierarchy consists of the
specific, discrete affects that long have been the principal concern
of emotion theorists (see Tellegen et al., in press, for more details).
Finally, before leaving this topic, we must emphasize a key
point: Although affect ratings show some highly robust structural
properties (e.g., the same dimensions of Positive and Negative
Affect have emerged across a very wide range of assessment
conditions), it is unreasonable to posit a single, highly precise
"structure" of affect that can fit the data maximally well in all
possible contexts. The observed structure of affect necessarily
reflects the underlying processes that are influencing the ratings,
and these processes can be expected to change in different con-
texts. Put another way, the "true" correlation between two con-
structs can be expected to vary, even after controlling for mea-
surement error and other potential problems. For instance, the
correlation between measures of Negative Affect and Positive
Affect increases significantly during episodes of strong, intense
emotion (Diener & Iran-Nejad, 1986; Watson, 1988). This effect
likely occurs because extreme levels on one dimension generally
are incompatible with strong activation on the other (a point we
consider subsequently).
The bipolarity of the Positive Affect dimension offers a partic-
ularly striking example of structural instability. The data reported
in Table 2 suggest that the bipolarity of the dimension is much
stronger in ratings of current, momentary mood than in ratings of
daily mood. To document this point further, we calculated average
within-subject correlations among our Positive Affect, Negative
Affect, Fatigue (i.e.. low Positive Affect), and Serenity (i.e., low
Negative Affect) scales in four large data sets. Three of the
samples were described previously in conjunction with Table 2;
the fourth ("Moment Data-Iowa") consisted of 120 University of
Iowa undergraduates who rated their current mood every two
waking hours over the course of a week (M = 52.1 observations
per respondent; overall N = 6,254 observations). Thus, we have
two large samples (one from SMU, the other from Iowa) for each
type of rating.
The average within-subject correlations from these four samples
are reported in Table 3. The most striking aspect of these data is
that the correlation between Positive Affect and Fatigue consis-
tently is much stronger in the momentary ratings (rs = —.62 and
-.67) than in the daily ratings (rs = -.41 and -.41). It is
Table 3
Average Within-Subjects Correlations Between the PANAS
Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scales and
Measures of Fatigue and Serenity
Time frame
and sample
Moment data
SMU
Iowa
Daily data
SMU
Iowa
Total no.
observations
10,169
6,254
11,323
6,593
Fati
Positive
affect
-.62
-.67
-.41
-.41
gue
Negative
affect
.26
.14
.30
.26
Serenity
Positive
affect
.21
.03
.37
.37
Negative
affect
-.43
-.47
-.48
-.53
Note. PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; SMU = South-
em Methodist University.
noteworthy that the correlation between Negative Affect and Se-
renity was slightly higher in the daily data, which suggests that
there was no general bias operating against bipolarity in these
ratings. We suspect that this enormous difference in the Fatigue-
Positive Affect correlation largely reflects the fact that circadian
rhythms (which we discuss later) strongly influence momentary—
but not daily—mood ratings. As we will see, Positive Affect and
Fatigue both are carried along the same circadian wave, thereby
strengthening the association between them.
Terminological and Methodological Issues
Naming the dimensions. We next examine two important is-
sues that need to be considered in future work on this structure.
The first concerns the ongoing controversy regarding how the four
dimensions shown in Figure 1 should be named. Larsen and Diener
(1992) initiated this controversy by arguing that the labels Nega-
tive Affect and Positive Affect were misleading and should be
eliminated (for a response to some of their objections, see Watson
& Clark, 1997). They proposed instead a labeling system in which
all of the octants were defined in terms of Pleasantness and
Activation. For instance, in their terminological scheme, High
Positive Affect would be renamed Activated Pleasant Affect,
whereas Low Positive Affect becomes Unactivated Unpleasant
Affect. This terminology since has been adopted by other research-
ers, such as Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998).
This terminological scheme makes perfect sense if one assumes
that Pleasantness and Activation are the basic dimensions of affect.
Put another way, defining the octants as combinations of Pleas-
antness and Activation makes sense only if one assumes that these
dimensions are the basic defining features of affect. Because we do
not agree that this is the case (or, at least, that this has been clearly
established empirically), we cannot support the use of this termi-
nology. Indeed, in our view it eliminates one of the most attractive
features of the scheme used in Figure 1, namely, that the two major
alternative rotations are given equal weight through the use of two
different labeling schemes (i.e., Pleasantness-Engagement on the
one hand vs. Positive Affect-Negative Affect on the other).
Still, there is no point in retaining the Figure 1 terminology if
some of its labels are inaccurate or misleading. Are the labels
Negative Affect and Positive Affect, in fact, misleading? In our
view, the most serious criticism of these names is that they
misrepresent the actual valence of these dimensions (see Feldman
Barrett & Russell, 1998). That is, although the name Positive
Affect implies that it is a dimension reflecting fluctuations in
positively valenced mood states, Figure 1 indicates that it actually
contains unpleasant, negatively valenced terms (e.g., dull, slug-
gish) at its low pole. In parallel fashion, the Negative Affect
dimension—which should tap variations in negatively valenced
states—actually includes pleasant, positively valenced affects
(e.g., relaxed, calm) at its low end.
Although this objection has some merit, we have not found it
persuasive, for two reasons. First, although a simple schematic
model (such as Figure 1) gives equal weight to both ends of these
dimensions, we believe that their high poles actually are much
more important. An inspection of the most prominent inventories
that assess mood at the specific affect level—such as the Mood
Adjective Check List (Nowlis, 1965), the Differential Emotions
Scale (Izard, Dougherty, Bloxom, & Kotsch, 1974), the MultipleSPECIAL SECTION: TWO GENERAL ACTIVATION SYSTEMS 827
Affect Adjective Check List-Revised (Zuckerman & Lubin,
1985), the Profile of Mood States (McNair, Lorr. & Droppleman,
1971), and our own PANAS-X—indicates that they contain many
more high-activation terms than low-activation terms. The discrep-
ancy is particularly dramatic when one considers negatively va-
lenced terms. The High Negative Affect octant in Figure 1 actually
subsumes a very broad range of content, including numerous terms
related to the basic emotions of fear (e.g., fearful), anger (e.g.,
angry), disgust (e.g., disgusted), contempt (e.g., scornful), guilt
(e.g., guilty) and shame (e.g., ashamed)', in contrast, the Low
Negative Affect octant contains a relatively small number of terms
reflecting relaxation and serenity. Consequently, in a probabilistic
sense, it remains true that the Negative Affect and Positive Affect
dimensions are predominantly defined by negatively valenced and
positively valenced terms, respectively.
Second, as our view of these dimensions has evolved, we
increasingly have come to see them as truly unipolar constructs
that essentially are defined by their high poles. As we discuss in
greater detail shortly, we now view these dimensions as reflecting
two basic biobehavioral systems of activation. As such, the acti-
vated, high ends of the dimensions fully capture their essential
qualities. Moreover, although terms such as sluggish and relaxed
can be used to characterize low levels on these dimensions in
certain contexts, they do not intrinsically define the dimensions
themselves. This is because the low poles of these dimensions
ultimately reflect the absence of a particular kind of activation
rather than the presence of a certain affective state (such as
sluggishness or relaxation). Given that these dimensions are de-
fined by their activated ends, we again would argue that the labels
Negative Affect and Positive Affect are not misleading.
Nevertheless, it also has become obvious that these terms fail to
convey the activated nature of these dimensions adequately. There-
fore, in light of the evidence we consider later, we believe that the
labels Negative Activation (or NA) and Positive Activation (or PA)
provide a better, more accurate representation of these dimensions.
These new labels also underscore the close affinity between the PA
and NA dimensions and Thayer's (1989) influential constructs of
Energetic Arousal and Tense Arousal, respectively (although our
labels emphasize, in addition, the broad hedonic contrast between
the two activation dimensions). We therefore will adopt this ter-
minology throughout the remainder of this article.
Modeling measurement error. The second key issue concerns
measurement error and the role it may play in structural data.
Although mood researchers have been concerned with the poten-
tial effects of random and systematic error for many years (e.g.,
Bentler, 1969; Diener & Emmons, 1984; Russell, 1979, 1980),
most of the work in this area has been based on raw, uncorrected
data (e.g., in exploratory factor analysis). In an influential article,
however. Green et al. (1993) challenged this practice, arguing that
by failing to account for measurement error, analyses of uncor-
rected data yielded a highly distorted and misleading view of
affective structure. To support this assertion, Green et al. con-
ducted a series of analyses demonstrating that the bipolarity of the
Pleasantness dimension became substantially stronger after ac-
counting for random and systematic error. Feldman Barrett and
Russell (1998) echoed this sentiment, arguing that results such as
these have "delivered the coup de grace to all research in which
conclusions are based directly on the observed correlation between
measures of affect" (p. 5).
We entirely agree that measurement error can significantly
distort observed correlations and, therefore, that it is important to
model both random and nonrandom sources of error in future work
in this area. Nevertheless, we also must voice two concerns re-
garding how this issue has been examined in the contemporary
literature. First, although error is undeniably important, its effects
have been overstated by some recent writers (for a more detailed
discussion of this point, see Watson & Clark, 1997). For instance,
in discussing the results of their Study 1, Green et al. (1993)
pointed out that an observed correlation of —.25 was transformed
to a latent correlation of -.84 after controlling for error (see p.
1033). In summarizing Green et al.'s findings, Feldman Barrett
and Russell (1998) emphasized this same point, noting that "In one
dramatic example, the correlation between observed scores of
happiness and those on sadness was —.25; the correlation between
their latent scores was estimated to be —.84" (p. 968).
The problem with these examples is that this —.25 value does
not accurately reflect the true nature of the observed correlations.
Indeed, the mean uncorrected correlation in these data (after r-to-z
transformation) was —.53, which already indicates a substantial
degree of overlap. Moreover, Green et al. (1993) also reported that
simply summing the observed measures into aggregate scores
yielded a raw correlation of —.72. More generally, our inspection
of the relevant literature suggests that controlling for measurement
error can be expected to transform (a) low correlations into mod-
erate correlations and (b) moderate to strong correlations into very
strong correlations but that it will not turn (c) low correlations into
strong correlations. As an example of (a), in analyzing the relation
between positive and negative mood states, Tellegen et al. (1994)
found 'that uncorrected correlations ranging from -.12 to -.25
yielded a latent correlation of —.43 after controlling for both
random and systematic error. Similarly, Diener et al. (1995) re-
ported that observed correlations ranging from .04 to —.28 corre-
sponded to a latent value of —.44. As an example of (b), Feldman
Barrett and Russell (1998. Study 2) reported that raw, uncorrected
correlations (between measures of Pleasantness and Unpleasant-
ness) ranging from —.66 to —.86 (M = —.77) corresponded to a
latent correlation of —.93 and that raw correlations (between
measures of high and low Activation) ranging from —.33 to —.66
(M = -.54) yielded a latent correlation of —.80.
Our second concern involves how error has been modeled in the
contemporary literature. Although other approaches have also been
used (e.g., Diener et al., 1995; Tellegen et al., 1994, in press), the
most popular strategy has been to adopt a multiformat approach in
which a variety of different formats (e.g., adjective checklist,
Likert rating scales) are used to measure the same constructs (e.g.,
Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998; Green et al., 1993). If properly
used, this multiformat approach can provide an excellent way of
modeling—and eliminating—both random and systematic sources
of error (for a detailed discussion, see Green et al., 1993).
The problem with this approach—which has not been readily
acknowledged in the contemporary literature—is that it requires
that investigators create multiple "parallel forms" of the same
constructs, which is not an easy or straightforward task. The
ever-present danger is that systematic differences in content will
emerge across the various formats, thereby distorting the results
(and, in turn, presenting a distorted picture of the model being
tested). As one example, Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998)
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(corresponding to Low Negative Affect in Figure 1) using three
different formats. For instance, using a unipolar Likert rating
format, they created a scale consisting of the terms relaxed, at rest,
serene, calm, and at ease. An inspection of Figure 1 indicates that
this scale captures the content of the octant quite nicely.
Unfortunately, the scales created for the other two formats are
less satisfactory. For instance, the parallel 5-item measure in the
agree-disagree format contains the item "I'm feeling pleasantly
well-rested"; the insertion of the word pleasantly in this context
would seem to displace the scale toward the Pleasantness octant
(which includes the term pleasant) in Figure 1. This problem
appears to be exacerbated in their 6-item scale in the "Describes
Me" format, which contains both "I feel pleasantly at rest" and "I
feel comfortable and content" (note that content also is a marker of
Pleasantness in Figure 1). Thus, rather than being unambiguous
measures of Low Negative Affect, these scales also appear to
contain a substantial component of Pleasantness. In ordinary us-
age, this level of distortion might not be problematic; when one is
testing a precise model in confirmatory factor analysis, however, it
may produce misleading results (e.g.. in this particular case, it
might help to explain why the corrected correlation between high
and low Negative Affect failed to approach —1.00).
This problem represents a special case of the more general
process of construct validation. As Cronbach and Meehl (1955)
rightly noted, the process of construct validation involves both (a)
articulating a set of constructs that arc embedded in a larger
nomological network and (b) developing a series of observable
measures that enable one to subject this theoretical model to
empirical scrutiny. If the theory is confirmed, then this "boot-
straps" one's confidence in every aspect of the network, including
both the underlying constructs and the observable measures. If the
theory is diseonfirmed. however, then the problem could exist
anywhere within the network: It could reflect problems in the
underlying theory, but it also could represent difficulties in the
operationalization of the measures. Viewed in this light, we sug-
gest that researchers need to establish the construct validity of their
measures with greater care before using them to test the adequacy
of these precise structural models. We may find that our models
(such as the one shown in Figure 1) actually fit the data well when
highly valid measures are used.
The Two Activation Systems of Affect
Which Dimensions Are "Basic"?
The circular structure displayed in Figure 1 includes four gen-
eral bipolar dimensions. More precisely, it contains two different
pairs of quasi-independent axes (Pleasantness-Activation and PA-
NA), each of which defines an orderly two-dimensional space. As
has repeatedly been noted in the recent literature, these paired axes
therefore represent alternative conceptualizations of the same basic
structure (e.g., Feldman Barrett & Russell. 1998; Larsen & Diener,
1992; Meyer & Shack, 1989; Watson, 1988; Watson & Tellegen,
1985). This, in turn, has led to a question that has been frequently
asked—but never adequately answered—in the mood literature:
Which pair of axes actually reflects the fundamental, "basic"
dimensions of affect?
We believe that this question is both unanswerable and unpro-
ductive. In our view, both sets of axes reflect important aspects of
affective experience. For instance, as we discuss shortly, the PA
and NA dimensions represent the subjective components of more
general biobehavioral systems that have evolved to handle key
adaptive tasks. Note, however, that similar arguments could be
mustered in support of the Pleasantness and Activation axes. For
example, various theorists have argued that as part of the evolution
of the basic emotions, animals have developed a fundamental,
innate tendency to appraise ongoing events and experiences as
either "good" (i.e., opportunities) or "bad" (i.e.. threats or dangers;
e.g.. Lazarus, 1991; Nesse. 1991). Indeed, valence is such a salient
aspect of our appraisal process that humans almost instantaneously
evaluate their ongoing state as either pleasant/positive or unpleas-
ant/negative, even in deactivated states. For instance, if a person
currently is feeling very little—and appraises this situation as
satisfactory—then he or she would use terms such as calm and
relaxed (reflecting a pleasant state of deactivalion) to describe the
experience. Conversely, if the situation is deemed to be somewhat
unsatisfactory, then terms such as bored and dull (representing an
unpleasant state of deactivation) would be used. We suspect that
this innate and essentially universal classifactory response helps to
explain the robust emergence of a general Pleasantness-
Unpleasantness dimension in self-report data.
Therefore, both pairs of axes arguably are "basic" in some
sense. Indeed, we may view them as alternative explanatory
schemes with somewhat different "ranges of convenience" (Kelly.
1955). That is. each model could be maximally useful for under-
standing and explaining different sets of phenomena (see also
Larsen & Diener. 1992).
Whv Focus on Positive and Negative Activation?
Nevertheless, as is apparent from our previous work in this area
(e.g.. Watson. 1988; Watson & Clark. 1997; Watson & Tellegen,
1985), we generally find the model defined by the PA and NA axes
to be particularly useful. The reason for this, in part, is that we
have found these dimensions to provide a highly parsimonious
explanation of certain affect-related phenomena, such as the cyclic
data we discuss shortly. Beyond that, we also offer two general
considerations. First, we believe that these are the most interesting
dimensions in capturing the vicissitudes of everyday experience. In
this regard, it is noteworthy that although one can find terms to fit
any region of the circle depicted in Figure 1. the High NA and
High PA octants are among the most densely populated areas
within the space. Indeed, as we suggested earlier, the High NA
octant is a particularly rich source of affect descriptors, containing
dozens of commonly used terms. The High PA, Pleasantness, and
Unpleasantness octants also contain numerous terms, but the four
remaining octants (Engagement, Disengagement, Low PA, Low
NA) are more sparsely populated and contain relatively few good
markers.
We emphasize that we are not suggesting that this abundance of
good markers qualifies these dimensions as basic in some absolute
sense. Rather, our point is that because affect words are developed
to describe highly significant feeling states, one reasonably can
argue that the more densely populated regions in the space repre-
sent the areas of greatest interest in everyday life. It certainly is no
accident that the High NA octant is particularly rich in descriptors,
in that it subsumes several of the basic affects (e.g., fear, anger,
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classical models of emotion. This, incidentally, illustrates another
important advantage of this particular conceptual scheme, namely,
that it lends itself nicely to a more inclusive hierarchical structure
in which each of the general dimensions can be decomposed into
multiple discrete affects. Thus, the NA dimension can be subdi-
vided into specific affects, such as fear, guilt, and anger, whereas
PA can be subdivided into joy, interest, and so on (see Tellegen et
al., in press; Watson & Clark, 1992a, 1997; Watson & Tellegen,
1985).
The second general consideration concerns the Activation or
Arousal dimension (which in Figure 1 is labeled Engagement vs.
Disengagement) in the alternative scheme. As discussed previ-
ously, we believe that the bipolar Pleasantness-Unpleasantness
dimension reflects important and intrinsic qualities of affective
experience; as such, it is essential to any complete understanding
of mood. We have found the Activation/Arousal dimension to be
less compelling, for two reasons. First, because of a relative dearth
of good marker terms, it is more troublesome to measure this
dimension than any of the others in Figure I. Indeed, as Figures 2
and 3 illustrate, it has proven difficult to identify affectively
neutral terms that fall directly on the hypothesized Activation axis.
Because of this paucity of good markers, investigators who are
interested in assessing Activation typically are forced to use va-
lenced terms that are not clear, unambiguous measures of the
dimension. For instance, Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) in-
cluded both a number of positively valenced items (e.g., alert,
filled with energy, full of energy) and negatively valenced items
(e.g.. stirred up, keyed up) in their measures of high Activation.
Second, in our own work we have sought to develop a
conceptual-assessment scheme that is maximally robust and flex-
ible and, therefore, can be used in both within- and between-
subjects analyses and in both state and trait ratings of affect.
Although the concept of Arousal/Activation makes excellent sense
when applied to short-term affect (especially ratings of current,
momentary mood), its relevance to long-term individual differ-
ences in emotionality is less apparent. In this regard, it is telling
that although investigators have explored related concepts such as
Affect Intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1987), there has been less
interest in dispositional differences in Arousal per se (for discus-
sions of the personality correlates of Arousal, however, see Larsen
& Diener, 1992; Mehrabian, 1996).
In contrast, the PA and NA dimensions lend themselves well to
dispositional analyses and have been widely studied in this man-
ner. Thus, trait measures of NA reflect stable individual differ-
ences in the tendency to experience aversive emotional states, such
as fear, guilt, sadness, and anger, whereas trait PA scales assess
characteristic differences in the experience of positive states, such
as enthusiasm, confidence, and cheerfulness. Moreover, measures
of these "Big Two" affective dimensions have been found to be
strongly and systematically related to the "Big Two" traits of
personality—Neuroticism and Extraversion—that have been in-
cluded in virtually all major dispositional models (see Watson,
Clark, & Harkness, 1994; Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, &
Teta, 1993). Specifically, measures of trait NA are strongly cor-
related with Neuroticism but are more weakly related to Extraver-
sion; conversely, measures of trait PA are more strongly related to
Extraversion than to Neuroticism (for a review, see Watson &
Clark, 1992b). Indeed, on the basis of these strong and robust
associations, Tellegen (1985) argued that Neuroticism and Extra-
version could be relabeled Negative Emotionality and Positive
Emotionality, respectively.
To document this point further, we examined relations between
the Big Two of affect and the Big Two of personality in 12
samples with a combined N of 4,457. Respondents in all samples
completed the trait NA and PA scales from the PANAS. In
addition, the participants were assessed on the Neuroticism and
Extraversion scales from one of the following instruments: NEO
Five-Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992), NEO Personality
Inventory-Revised (Costa & McCrae, 1992), NEO Personality
Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1985), Big Five Inventory (John,
Donahue, & Kentle, 1991). and revised versions of scales origi-
nally developed by Goldberg (see Watson & Clark, 1992b). To
eliminate differences in metric across these various instruments,
we standardized the scores on a within-sample basis and then
combined them to permit a single overall analysis.
The resulting correlations are presented in Table 4. As expected,
trait NA correlated very strongly with Neuroticism (r = .58),
whereas trait PA was strongly related to Extraversion (r = .51). In
addition, trait NA correlated more moderately with Extraversion
(r = —.25): similarly, trait PA correlated —.33 with Neuroticism.
These latter correlations reflect, in part, the moderate overlap
between Extraversion and Neuroticism (r = —.31). Indeed, after
controlling for Neuroticism, the partial correlation between trait
NA and Extraversion was only —.08; in parallel fashion, after
controlling for Extraversion, the partial correlation between trait
PA and Neuroticism was reduced to —.17.
Thus, the NA and PA dimensions show strong and systematic
associations with the Big Two of personality. We again emphasize
that these data cannot establish that these affect dimensions are
basic in any fundamental sense. Our point, rather, is that this
particular conceptual scheme offers an especially attractive frame-
work to researchers who are interested in affect at both the state
and the trait levels.
The Nature of PA and NA
General systems of approach and withdrawal. We turn now to
an examination of the basic functions and evolutionary signifi-
cance of the PA and NA dimensions. Earlier we suggested that PA
and NA represent the subjective components of more general
biobehavioral systems. Specifically, the accumulating evidence
increasingly indicates that fluctuations in these self-report dimen-
sions reflect the operation of two broad, evolutionarily adaptive
motivational systems that mediate goal-directed approach and
Table 4
Correlations Between the "Big Two" of Affect and
the "Big Two" of Personality
Measure 1
Affectivity
1. Trait Negative
2. Trait Positive
Personality
3. Neuroticism
4. Extraversion
Affect
Affect
—
-.19
.58
-.25
—
-.33
.51 -.31 —
Note. N = 4,457. All correlations are significant atp < .001, two-tailed.830 WATSON. WIESE, VAIDYA. AND TELLEGEN
withdrawal behaviors (Carver & White, 1994; Depue & Collins, in
press; Depue, Luciana, Arbisi, Collins, & Leon, 1994; Kring &
Bachorowski, in press; Tomarken & Keener, 1998). The with-
drawal system typically has been labeled the behavioral inhibition
system (BIS; e.g., Fowles, 1987, 1994); in contrast, the approach
system has been given a variety of names, including the behavioral
activation system (e.g., Fowles, 1987), the behavioral engagement
system (e.g., Depue, Krauss, & Spoont, 1987), and the behavioral
facilitation system (BFS; e.g., Depue et al., 1994). To avoid any
confusion with the dimensions included in the affect circumplex
(e.g.. Engagement is listed as a dimension in Figure 1), we will
refer to it as the BFS.
A brief examination of these broader motivational systems will
help to clarify the basic functions of the NA and PA dimensions.
First, accumulating evidence suggests that the self-report NA
dimension represents the subjective component of the withdrawal-
oriented BIS (e.g.. Carver & White, 1994; Tomarken & Keener,
1998). In behavioral terms, the essential purpose of the BIS is to
keep the organism out of trouble—that is. it inhibits behavior that
might lead to pain, punishment, or some other undesirable conse-
quence. Put differently, the primary function of this system is to
help organisms avoid aversive stimuli. Gray (1987) called the BIS
a "stop, look, and listen system" to emphasize how it redirects
attention toward the environment (see also Fowles, 1994). Accord-
ing to Gray. BIS activity focuses maximum attention on analyzing
environmental stimuli, especially novel stimuli that could poten-
tially signal danger. The BIS also has a strongly anticipatory
quality: It promotes a vigilant scanning of the environment for
potential threats and motivates the organism to move cautiously
until safety is indicated.
Viewed in this light, it becomes clear that the negative feeling
states associated with the NA dimension promote the vigilant
apprehensiveness that is characteristic of the BIS. For instance,
feelings of nervousness and fear motivate organisms to escape
from situations of potential threat or danger. Similarly, anticipa-
tory states of apprehension and worry help individuals to avoid
settings that previously have been associated with pain and pun-
ishment. In a related vein, feelings of revulsion and disgust help to
keep organisms away from noxious and toxic substances (see
Depue & Iacono, 1989; Depue et al., 1987; Fowles, 1987, 1994;
Tellegen, 1985).
In contrast, variations in self-rated PA reflect the operation of
the BFS (e.g.. Depue et al., 1987, 1994; Tellegen, 1985; Tomarken
& Keener, 1998). The BFS is an appetitive system of behavioral
approach rather than avoidance or inhibition: It directs organisms
toward situations and experiences that potentially may yield plea-
sure and reward. Fowles (1987) described it as "a reward-seeking
or approach system that responds to positive incentives by acti-
vating behavior" (p. 418). Similarly, Depue and Collins (in press)
characterized it as a system of "behavioral approach based on
incentive motivation" (p. 8). They further noted that this incentive
motivation "is associated with a unipolar dimension of positive
affect, ranging from strong presence to complete absence at the
extremes" (p. 7). The basic adaptive function of the BFS is to
ensure that organisms obtain the resources (e.g., food and water,
warmth and shelter, the cooperation of others, sexual partners) that
are essential to the survival of both the individual and the species.
The positive feeling states associated with the PA dimension
appear to serve both as a motivating source of—and as an affective
reward for—these goal-directed behaviors. That is, enhanced feel-
ings of energy and vigor increase the subjective perception that
one is capable of performing these behaviors; in a related vein,
elevated levels of enthusiasm and confidence increase the expec-
tation that goal-directed activities ultimately will be rewarded.
Thus, these types of positive feelings generally can be expected to
increase the likelihood that goal-directed activities will be per-
formed. Once they are performed, heightened feelings of pleasure
and delight represent the affective reward for a successful perfor-
mance. On the other hand, low levels of PA are associated with
depressed affect (e.g., Clark, Watson. & Mineka, 1994: Mineka,
Watson, & Clark, 1998: Tellegen, 1985).
The adaptive importance of this affective reward is most clearly
manifested in the melancholic subtype of major depression, which
is characterized by either a "loss of pleasure in all, or almost all,
activities" or a "lack of reactivity to usually pleasurable stimuli"
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 384). Because they
fail to receive sufficient reward for their efforts, individuals with
melancholic depression become unmotivated and show a pervasive
reduction in goal-directed behaviors (see also Kring & Ba-
chorowski, in press; Tomarken & Keener, 1998). Note that this
link to melancholic depression further demonstrates that deficits in
PA and the BFS play a crucial role in certain types of mood
disorder, a point we return to subsequently.
Neurobiological basis of NA and PA. Although our under-
standing of the underlying biological substrates of these systems
remains somewhat sketchy, considerable progress has been made
in recent years. Davidson, Tomarken, and their colleagues have
conducted an important line of research examining hemispheric
asymmetry in the prefrontal cortex (for a review, see Tomarken &
Keener, 1998). This research was stimulated by preliminary evi-
dence indicating that unilateral lesions or sedation of the left
frontal lobe were associated with a "depressive-catastrophic" re-
action, whereas lesions or sedation of the right frontal area were
associated with either a relatively neutral mood or elevated PA
(e.g., Gainotti, Caltagirone, & Zoccolotti, 1993; Starkstein & Rob-
inson, 1989). This evidence led Davidson and Tomarken to ex-
plore more systematically the affective implications of resting
anterior asymmetry (Davidson, 1992; Davidson & Tomarken,
1989: Tomarken & Keener, 1998). Their data have consistently
demonstrated that happy, euthymic individuals tend to show rela-
tively greater resting activity in the left prefrontal cortex than in
the right prefrontal area; conversely, dysphoric and dissatisfied
individuals display relatively greater right anterior activity.
It has proven difficult to isolate the specific effects of left versus
right prefrontal activity in these studies. Some recent evidence,
however, suggests that PA primarily reflects the level of resting
activity in the left prefrontal area, whereas NA is more strongly
and systematically associated with right frontal activation (Bruder
et al., 1997; Davidson, 1992; Tomarken & Keener, 1998). On the
basis of these data, Davidson and Tomarken have linked frontal
asymmetry to the operation of the BIS and BFS. Specifically, they
argue that resting levels of left prefrontal activation reflect indi-
vidual differences in the approach-oriented BFS and the subjective
experience of PA. Tomarken and Keener (1998), for instance,
argued that "relative left frontal activation is associated with
heightened appetitive or incentive motivation, heightened respon-
sivity to rewards or other positive stimuli, and greater contact with
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engaging" (p. 395). Conversely, they posited that resting levels of
right frontal activation reflect individual differences in the
withdrawal-oriented BIS and the subjective experience of NA.
Summarizing across these findings, Tomarken and Keener (1998)
concluded that "these lateralized systems not only influence ap-
proach and withdrawal motivation but also the positive and neg-
ative emotions that are often linked to approach and withdrawal"
(p. 403).
Furthermore, each of the major ascending monoaminergic neu-
rotransmitter systems—norepinephrine, serotonin, and dopa-
mine—has significant projections to the frontal cortex (Goldman-
Rakic, Lidow, & Gallagher, 1990), indicating that this analysis can
be extended to the subcortical level. Indeed, Gray (1982, 1987) has
written extensively on the neutral substrate of the BIS, arguing that
it consists of (a) the septo-hippocampal system (SHS), (b) the
closely related Papez loop, (c) ascending monoaminergic pathways
(including both noradrenergic pathways that connect the SHS to
the locus ceruleus and serotonergic projections that link it with the
raphe nuclei), and (d) neocortical structures that are in reciprocal
communication with the SHS (see Gray, 1987, Figure 3).
In contrast, the ascending dopaminergic system has been
strongly implicated in the operation of the BFS and in the subjec-
tive experience of PA. This system arises from cell groups located
in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and has
projections throughout the cortex (Depue & Collins, in press;
Depue et al., 1994; Le Moal & Simon, 1991). Consistent with the
data reported by Davidson and Tomarken, these cortical projec-
tions tend to be concentrated in the left hemisphere, with a par-
ticularly strong asymmetry in the frontal region (Tucker & Wil-
liamson, 1984). A substantial body of evidence has established that
the dopaminergic system mediates various approach-related be-
haviors, including heightened appetitive motivation, enhanced be-
havioral approach to incentive stimuli, and increased engagement
with the environment (e.g., Depue & Collins, in press; Depue et
al., 1994; Depue & Iacono, 1989; Stellar & Stellar, 1985; Wise &
Rompre, 1989).
In an interesting extension of this literature, Depue et ai. (1994)
related this system to stable individual differences in affectivity.
Depue et ai. administered biological agents known to stimulate
dopaminergic activity and then measured the strength of the sys-
tem's response across various individuals. They found that various
measures of dopaminergic activity were strongly correlated with
individual differences in trait PA but were unrelated to trait NA.
Depue et al. noted further that "many of the behavioral and
hormonal effects of dopamine activation are significantly influ-
enced by genetic variation in dopamine cell number, including
those dopamine cell groups in the VTA" (p. 486), implicating
interindividual variations in the number of dopamine neurons as a
possible source for hereditary differences in trait PA. In other
words, variation in dopamine cell number in critical regions such
as the VTA may lead some individuals to be more energetic,
enthusiastic, and confident than others.
Distinctive Qualities of PA and NA
Distribution of PA and NA scores over time. Once the diver-
gent tasks of the BIS (i.e., to keep organisms out of trouble) and
the BFS (i.e., to mobilize organisms to obtain vital resources) are
understood, it is easy to see why the NA and PA dimensions
display some strikingly different properties. As one example,
positive and negative moods show markedly different distributions
over time. Specifically, analyses of daily mood fluctuations in both
American respondents (Zevon & Tellegen, 1982) and Japanese
respondents (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1984) demonstrated that
NA scores were positively skewed and leptokurtic (i.e., more
"peaked" than a normal distribution), with most of the scores
packed within a relatively narrow range slightly below the mean.
However, extremely elevated scores also occurred with some
regularity in both samples and appeared to constitute "emergency
reactions" to ongoing crises. Thus, consistent with the basic func-
tions of the BIS, NA scores remain relatively low in the absence of
threat or danger but quickly elevate in response to potential
emergencies.
In contrast, Zevon and Tellegen (1982) and Watson et al. (1984)
both found that PA scores were roughly symmetrical and slightly
platykurtic, indicating that the distribution was somewhat "flatter"
(i.e., showing less of a peak around the mean) than that of a classic
normal curve, showing substantial variability across a very broad
range. This markedly different distribution reflects the fact that the
BFS primarily is concerned with approach and appetitive behav-
iors rather than potential threats, crises, and emergencies. As Clark
and Watson (1988) put it, "PA ebbs and flows with the daily tide
of events, whereas NA crashes upon us in times of trouble only to
disappear just as quickly when the storm is over" (p. 305).
Endogenous rhythms in PA. The distinctive functions of the
BIS and BFS also clarify why PA—but not NA—is strongly
influenced by endogenous rhythms that reflect the operation of
internal "biological clocks" (Clark, Watson, & Leeka, 1989;
Thayer, 1978, 1989). As we have discussed, NA and the BIS
primarily serve to keep organisms away from danger. Conse-
quently, this system is designed to be highly reactive in character.
That is, NA levels should be elevated in response to threat (e.g.,
being threatened by a predator) but remain at relatively low levels
in the absence of danger. Because environmental threats tend not
to occur at regularly scheduled times (e.g., predators do not plan
their attacks for 2 p.m.), there is no compelling reason why animals
should experience a sudden upsurge of fear or anger at a particular
hour of the day (such as 2 p.m.). In fact, in the absence of any clear
benefit to the organism, it is evolutionarily disadvantageous to
experience high-activation states such as fear and anger, in that
they (a) consume more energy, thereby increasing the amount of
food that is necessary for survival and (b) place greater strain on
bodily resources, thereby heightening the possibility of physiolog-
ical exhaustion (e.g., Selye, 1976; Webb, 1979). Accordingly,
endogenous rhythms should exert little systematic influence on the
NA dimension.
In contrast, the approach and appetitive behaviors mediated by
the BFS (e.g., eating, drinking, socializing, sexual activity) operate
on an entirely different logic. These behaviors obviously must be
performed with a certain frequency, but it rarely is necessary that
they be emitted at a particular time or in a specific context; for
instance, although humans need to eat periodically to survive, it is
not essential that we eat a bagel every night at midnight. Conse-
quently, the BFS possesses considerable flexibility in determining
exactly where and when these approach behaviors are performed.
When should these appetitive behaviors be encouraged? Again,
from an evolutionary perspective these high-activation states
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organism—that is, when reward is reasonably likely and the risk of
danger is relatively low (e.g., Webb, 1979). Note, moreover, that
the availability of resources—and the relative risk of harm—often
can be predicted in advance as a function of time. For instance,
foraging is much more likely to be rewarded when food is rela-
tively plentiful (e.g.. during the summer) than when it is extremely
scarce (e.g., during the dead of winter). Similarly, in species with
poor night vision, foraging will be more frequently rewarded
during the daylight hours than after dark. Because the probability
of risk and reward can be specified in advance, PA and the BFS
should be subject to preprogrammed biological cycles that vary
widely across species but are highly consistent within species. The
basic function of these endogenous rhythms is to increase the
likelihood that species members will be active and energetic at
those times when resources arc plentiful and the relative risk is
low; conversely, animals should tend to be sluggish and inactive
when resources are scarce or when the threat of danger is high (for
related discussions, see Clark et al.. 1989; Depuc et al.. 1987;
Webb. 1979).
These considerations lead to the expectation that PA and the
BFS should show preprogrammed endogenous cycles (a) over the
course of the day and (b) across the seasons of the year. With
regard to the latter, many animal species do, in fact, show sub-
stantial variations in appetitive behaviors (such as reproduction)
and in general activity level across the seasons of the year (e.g..
Kasper & Rosenthal, 1989; Tamarkin. Baird, & Almeida, 1985).
Seasonal variation is seen most dramatically in hibernation, which
involves a marked reduction in body temperature and the meta-
bolic rate, thereby serving as an extremely powerful mechanism
for energy conservation (e.g.. Mrosovsky. 1988). Hibernation per
se. however, ordinarily is confined to small mammals who nor-
mally cannot survive long without eating; larger mammals (includ-
ing humans) can thrive much longer without eating and therefore
have no need for this mode of adaptation (Mrosovsky, 1988).
Nevertheless, many researchers have noted the striking parallels
between hibernation and seasonal affective disorder, an illness that
is characterized by an atypical depression during the late fall or
winter; this depression often is followed by a hypomanic episode
during the spring or summer (Kasper & Rosenthal, 1989; Mro-
sovsky, 1988). These clear parallels led Kasper and Rosenthal
(1989) to suggest that this fall/winter depression originally devel-
oped as a means of conserving energy during times of food
scarcity.
Beyond these suggestive data regarding seasonal affective dis-
order, however, we currently lack compelling evidence regarding
seasonal variations in PA. In contrast, it has been clearly estab-
lished that PA shows a robust and well-defined circadian cycle
over the course of the day (e.g., Clark et al.. 1989; Thayer, 1987.
1989). Specifically, PA scores tend to rise throughout the morning
and then remain elevated throughout the rest of the day; they then
decline substantially during the evening. NA, however, shows little
or no systematic rhythm over the course of the day.
This circadian rhythm is quite robust and is broadly character-
istic of the PA dimension. To document this latter point, we report
data from the two momentary samples that previously were de-
scribed in conjunction with Tables 2 and 3. Both samples rated
their current momentary mood on the general Negative Affect
scale of the PANAS as well as four specific scales from the
PANAS-X that have been shown to be strong markers of the PA
dimension in momentary mood data: Joviality (e.g., happy, enthu-
siastic, energetic). Self-Assurance (e.g., confident, daring), Atten-
tiveness (e.g., alert, concentrating), and Fatigue (e.g., sleepv.
sluggish). Scores on this last scale were reversed in these analyses
to facilitate comparison with the other PA markers.
Recall that participants in the first sample (Moment Data-SMU)
were 226 SMU undergraduates who rated their current mood on
the PANAS-X once per day for 45 days (these analyses are based
on an overall N of 9.951 observations; M = 44.1 per respondent).
Each day, they made their ratings during one of five different time
periods, which alternated on a prearranged, random schedule:
rising (within 1 hr of getting up), morning (any time before noon),
afternoon (noon-6 p.m.), evening (any time after 6 p.m.), and
retiring (within 1 hr of going to bed). Once again, to eliminate all
between-subjects variance, we standardized these ratings (M = 0,
SD = 1) on a within-subject basis and collapsed them across all
participants. Finally, we computed mean affect scores for seven
3-hr time periods (6 a.m.-9 a.m., 9 a.m.-noon, etc.).
Participants in the second sample (Moment Data—Iowa) were
120 University of Iowa undergraduates who rated their current
mood over the course of a week (these analyses are based on a total
N of 6,233 observations: M = 51.9 per respondent). Each day. the
participants completed both a rising and a retiring mood rating. In
between, they rated their momentary mood every 2 hr; note,
however, that each participant was allowed to choose either an
even-hour schedule (e.g., 10 a.m., noon) or an odd-hour schedule
(e.g., 9 a.m., 11 a.m.) to accommodate differences in classes and
lifestyle. As in the first sample, we standardized these ratings on a
within-subject basis and then collapsed them across all partici-
pants, finally, we computed mean scores for each 2-hr block (7
a.m.-9 a.m.. 9 a.m.-l 1 a.m.. etc.).
These mean scores are displayed in Figures 4 (SMU sample)
and 5 (Iowa sample). Consistent with previous research. Negative
Affect scores showed a small amount of relatively unsystematic
variation in both samples. In contrast, the four PA marker scales all
exhibited a strong and systematic circadian cycle. Indeed, although
there were some minor differences (e.g., Attentiveness scores
peaked earlier than scores on the other scales in the Iowa sample),
it is clear that they all are being carried along the same circadian
wave and follow the same basic rhythm (most notably, they all are
quite low at the beginning and end of the day). Thus, these data
demonstrate that patterned cyclicity is broadly characteristic of the
PA dimension.
Animals exhibit a number of different circadian rhythms, many
of which emanate from the suprachiasmic nucleus of the hypo-
thalamus (e.g., Moore & Eichler. 1972). To date, variations in PA
have been clearly linked to two of these endogenous cycles. First,
a number of studies have reported average body temperature
curves that bear a striking resemblance to the circadian rhythm of
PA (e.g., Froberg, 1977; Thayer, 1989). Moreover, studies that
have examined these variables concurrently have found a close
correspondence between the two rhythms (e.g., Thayer, 1987,
1989). We have replicated these findings in our own data. Specif-
ically, the participants in the Iowa sample measured their body
temperature orally after completing their mood ratings at each
assessment. As before, these measures were standardized on a
within-subject basis and collapsed across respondents. Figure 6 is
a plot of the mean scores for NA, PA (both assessed with the
PANAS), and body temperature at hourly intervals over the courseSPECIAL SECTION: TWO GENERAL ACTIVATION SYSTEMS 833
0.6
0.4
Joviality ;
Assurance !
Attentiveness
Low Fatigue j
—D— Negative Affect!
-0.2 -
-o.e
Sam-
gam
Sam-
Noon
Noon-
3 pm
3 pm-
6pm
Time of Day
6pm-
9pm
9pm-
Mid
Mid-
Sam
Figure 4. Orcadian patterning of mean aftect scores in the Southern Methodist University (SMU) sample
(Moment Data-SMU).
of the day. Consistent with previous research, PA and body tem-
perature showed similar (but certainly not identical) cycles over
the day: Both tended to be quite low early in the morning and late
at night, with elevated levels during the day. Indeed, across the 18
hourly intervals, the correlation between mean PA and body tem-
perature was .79 (p < .001, two-tailed).
Second, PA scores vary systematically as a function of the
individual's location on the sleep-wake cycle. For instance, Clark
et al. (1989) demonstrated that mean PA scores tended to be
particularly low if the respondent had recently risen or was pre-
paring to retire, regardless of the time of day. As a further illus-
tration of this point, 104 of the SMU participants (N = 4,494
assessments) indicated their exact rising time (as well as the time
they completed their mood ratings) at each assessment, allowing us
to compute the time elapsed since rising. As in earlier analyses, we
standardized the data on an intraindividual basis and then com-
puted mean scores as a function of the elapsed time since rising;
these were calculated on an hourly basis (i.e., 0-1 hr, 1-2 hr, 2-3
hr, etc.). The resulting data for the Negative and Positive Affect
scales of the PANAS are depicted in Figure 7.
Except for a sudden, unexplained increase at approximately 12
hr post-rising, NA scores showed little systematic variation. In
marked contrast, PA scores varied dramatically as a function of
time since rising. PA levels were quite low within the first hour of
awakening; after that, they increased steadily and began to ap-
proach maximum levels at approximately 3 hr post-rising. PA
levels continued to increase for several more hours, however, until
reaching their zenith at roughly 8 hr post-rising. They then began
to decline—first slowly, then more rapidly. It is noteworthy that
the peak PA level occurred at the approximate midpoint between
the termination of the previous night's sleep (i.e., rising) and the
onset of the next night's sleep (i.e., retiring). It therefore appears834 WATSON, WIESE, VAIDYA, AND TELLEGEN
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that one can predict momentary PA scores reasonably well as a
function of the temporal proximity of sleep (see also Clark et al.,
1989). At a conceptual level, this link between sleep and PA is
hardly surprising, in that the sleep-wake cycle reflects the same
evolutionary pressures (most notably, the principle that energy
should be expended judiciously) and evolved as a highly efficient
means of energy conservation (e.g., Berger & Phillips, 1995;
Webb, 1979). In fact, it may be useful to view slow-wave sleep
(which is associated with a marked reduction in metabolic rate and
a substantially reduced rate of energy consumption) as the true
nadir in the naturally recurring cycle of BFS fluctuation.
We can extend this analysis further by noting that most of the
mood disorders also are characterized by well-defined cycles and
episodes that give rise to recurring rhythms over time. In the
bipolar disorders, for instance, the individual fluctuates between
well-defined episodes of mania (or hypomania) and depression.
Similarly, major depression tends to occur in episodes that may
spontaneously remit over time (American Psychiatric Association,
1994). Moreover, the melancholic subtype of depression fre-
quently shows a marked diurnal pattern in which the symptoms are
worst in the morning and then lessen in strength over the course of
the day. Finally, as discussed earlier, the mood disorders can show
a marked seasonal pattern, as is exhibited in seasonal affective
disorder (Kasper & Rosenthal, 1989; Mrosovsky, 1988).
It hardly is coincidental that these circadian and seasonal trends
parallel those observed with PA. Indeed, the evidence strongly
suggests that melancholic depression and bipolar disorder repre-
sent marked perturbations in PA and the BFS (see Clark et al.,
1994; Depue et al., 1987; Depue & Iacono, 1989; Mineka et al.,
1998; Tomarken & Keener, 1998). That is, mania and hypomania
typically are episodes of extremely elevated PA (i.e., the individual
feels elated and euphoric and has tremendous energy, confidence,
and enthusiasm), whereas melancholic depression is characterized
by a profound anhedonia and an almost total inability to expert-SPECIAL SECTION: TWO GENERAL ACTIVATION SYSTEMS 835
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ence pleasure. Furthermore, various lines of evidence also link the
mood disorders to disturbances in the sleep-wake cycle (e.g.,
Kupfer, 1976, 1995; Vogel, Neill, Hagler, & Kors, 1990; Wu &
Bunney, 1990). For instance, sleep in individuals with melancholic
depression tends to be relatively shallow, with increased Stage 1
and reduced amounts of slow-wave sleep. Furthermore, the archi-
tecture of REM sleep is seriously disturbed in many depressed
individuals; most notably, REM episodes occur (a) unusually early
in the non-REM-REM cycle and (b) with unusual frequency
during the early hours of sleep (e.g., Kupfer, 1976). Finally, sleep
deprivation is one of the most effective short-term treatments for
depression (Wu & Bunney, 1990). Thus, PA, sleep, and the mood
disorders all appear to reflect common underlying mechanisms in
which energy is expended and conserved in recurring cycles.
Implications for the independence of NA and PA. Even this
brief review is sufficient to demonstrate that NA and PA are highly
distinctive dimensions that reflect separate underlying systems. As
we discussed earlier, however, these two dimensions are not en-
tirely independent of one another, and a brief examination of these
systems may help to explain why this is so. As we have seen, NA
responses represent "emergency reactions" to ongoing crises. Can-
non (1929) established that emergency responses of this sort were
accompanied by numerous autonomic changes that were designed
to promote the efficient mobilization of energy and to permit a
very high level of sustained physical activity. It is noteworthy that
many of these changes involve temporarily shutting down nones-
sential functions (such as digestion) so that available resources can
be mustered for maximum effort. In parallel fashion, emergency
states of high NA likely are associated with a temporary shutdown
of the currently nonessential PA system. This, in turn, leads to the
specific prediction that states of intense NA should be associated
with low levels of PA, which is supported by existing data (Diener836 WATSON. WIESE. VAIDYA, AND TELLEGEN
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& Iran-Nejad, 1986; Watson, 1988). More generally, it seems
reasonable to propose that these two adaptive systems must be in
communication with—and be influenced by—one another.
Conclusion
Our goal was to establish that PA and NA are extremely useful
explanatory constructs that help to clarify important properties of
mood ratings and that reflect more general biobehavioral systems.
We reiterate that the evidence does not establish that NA and PA
are the only "basic" dimensions of affect. Similar arguments could
be used to support complementary conceptualizations, including
both alternative dimensional approaches and models emphasizing
the importance of discrete affects. We encourage future research-
ers to use a variety of approaches in seeking to understand this
extraordinarily complex domain of human experience.
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